


The European energy security: the case of natural gas

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
The relevance of security of gas supply for Europe

- Concerns about gas SoS underpinned inception/evolution of the Energy Union
- High priority given to gas as:
- It covers ¼ of EU mix; ⅓ imported from Russia; It is infrastructure-dependent (vs. oil/coal)



The security of the EU's gas supply: just all about Russia?

- Russia key driver for EU policy in the area (2006, 2009 gas crises and 2014 Ukr crisis)
- Gas SoS: traditionally an high priority for Central and Eastern EU Member States
- But gas SoS much wider issue (potentially involving all supplies from all suppliers):
 - Geopolitically volatile neighborhood (not just Russia but also Algeria, Libya...)
 - Commercial uncertainties (Norway production outlook, LNG market development...)
- SoS: a structural issue that will last for decades to come:




A look at the utilization rate of the EU gas import infrastructure

Pipelines (bcm/y)		
From	Capacity	Imports in 2014	Utilisation rate
Russia	230*	119	51%
Norway	127	101.1	79%
Algeria	54	19.5	36%
Libya	11	6	54%
Total	422	245.6	58%

LNG (bcm/y)			
Country	Capacity	Imports in 2014 (Net of re-exports)	Utilisation rate
Spain	60.2	17.6	29%
United Kingdom	50.7	18.5	36%
France	25.3	10.1	39%
Italy	15.3	7.2	47%
Netherlands	12	0.9	7%
Belgium	9	2.1	23%
Portugal	5.5	2.1	38%
Greece	5.2	0.8	15%
Lithuania	4	n.a.	n.a.
Sweden	0.3	n.a.	n.a.
TOTAL	183.5	59.3	32%

Estimating the margin of flexibility of the EU gas system




At aggregate level the EU does have a considerable margin of flexibility.

This margin could even accommodate the loss of the largest supplier.

Limited interconnections make this margin theoretical. Well interconnected EU market key for SoS.



Priority #1: build necessary interconnections in the EU to make the most of the existing LNG and storage infrastructure



Interconnecting the European (dis-)Union...

- EU put in place several tools to favour advancements of these projects
- 'Projects of Common Interest' (accelerated planning and permit granting, improved regulatory conditions, streamlined environmental assessment processes and access to financial support from Connecting Europe Facility)
- But still insufficient to speed-up projects, due to Member States' divergent interests
- EU LNG Capacity (bcm/y)

Example: MidCat Gas Pipeline project

Spain: - highest LNG capacity - utilization rate: **30%**

MidCat: - to allow exports to FR and other EU markets - cost: EUR 3 bn (SGC: EUR 35 bn)

- EU financial backing


France's opposition, to prevent competition on its market


No advancements in the project

Ensuring competitive supplies of LNG for Europe

LNG: a busy global market...

...with some next-door opportunities






Gas discoveries Tamar (2009) 280 bcm Leviathan (2010) 620 bcm Aphrodite (2011) 140 bcm Zohr (2015) 850 bcm Egypt LNG capacity Idku 11,5 bcm/y Damietta 7,6 bcm/y Currently not utilized!

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Priority #2: diversification of gas supply (suppliers & routes)

- The **Southern Gas Corridor**: a 3,500 km-long pipeline system to link the Caspian region
- By 2020, 10 bcm/y from Azerbaijan to Europe Future prospects remain uncertain



Conclusion: Energy: a clear example of how the EU is better off united!

- A unique, well functioning and well interconnected, EU gas market could provide great flexibility and security for all
- By acting together on external supply projects (e.g. Southern Gas Corridor) EU has more political and economic leverage
- Coordinating Europe's gas markets at EU level allows to seize synergies that single Member States cannot even see
- Gas (and overall energy) markets: a clear example of how EU is better off united!

Thank you!